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Abstract. This work focuses onto proposal and implementation of modification of SYN flood (DoS) attack detection algorithm. Based on Counting Bloom 
filter, the attack detection algorithm is proposed and implemented into KaTaLyzer network traffic monitoring tool. TCP attacks can be detected 
and network administrator can be notified in real-time about ongoing attack by using different notification methods. 
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MODYFIKACJA ALGORYTMU WYKRYWANIA ZMASOWEGO ATAKU TCP SYN FLOOD (DoS) 
Streszczenie. Praca koncentruje się na propozycji implementacji modyfikacji algorytmu wykrywania zmasowanego  SYN flood (DoS) ataku. Bazując na 
filtrze typu Counting Bloom, zaproponowano algorytm wykrywania ataku i zaimplementowano w narzędziu monitorowania ruchu w sieci - KaTaLyzer. 
Ataki TCP mogą być wykrywane i administrator sieci może być powiadamiany w czasie rzeczywistym o przeprowadzanym ataku dzięki różnym metodom 
powiadamiania. 
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Introduction  
Computer network security and privacy is currently on very 
high level due to various detection algorithms or protection 
mechanisms implemented on various network layers, network 
devices and directly in operating systems. Despite of all these, the 
most important factor remains in information about currently 
ongoing attack which administrators need to have in adequate 
time. Hence, this area is a space to create new effective solutions 
to detect and provide such information.  
In this work we focus on proposal of modification of SYN 
flood attack detection algorithm and its implementation into 
KaTaLyzer network traffic monitoring tool which has been 
developed at STUBA [1]. Based on Counting Bloom Filter (CBF) 
mechanism, our contribution is in modification and usage of the 
CBF of its tables which are used for storing counters of half-open 
connections (TCP). After detecting ongoing attack, network 
administrator is notified by chosen notification methods. 
It is assumed familiarity with the issue of DoS SYN flood 
attack. In case you are not familiar with DoS SYN flood attack, 
you can find more information at this link [2]. 
1. Bloom filter and its modification 
1.1. Bloom Filter algorithm 
Mathematics behind the Bloom Filter data structure is 
following: consider a set of m elements, in our case a set of m IP 
addresses, IP ={ ip1; ip2; ip3; …ipm}. The set will be described by 
a vector V which is n bits long, it is initially set to n zeros. Next, 
consider k independent hash functions which are used by the 
Bloom filter to generate k hash values from each of elements of 
the IP set. The hash functions output values are from range 
{1, …, n} and represent index in the vector V. If ith hash function 
hi(), 1≤i≤k, applied to members of IP, ipjIP, 1≤j≤m results in 
value K, i.e. K= hi(ipj), K
th bit of the V vector is set to 1. For each 
element ipiIP, 1≤i≤k, Kth bit of V vector is set to 1, while 
K=hi(ipj), for each 1≤j≤m, 1≤i≤k. 
According to relations among the hash functions and 
overlapping of their results, bits in V vector can be set to 1 
multiple times. However, only the first setting of Kth bit to 1 
changes the value of the bit. 
1.2. Counting Bloom Filter 
Assume a situation in which the elements of IP set change 
periodically and thus they are being inserted to and deleted from 
the data structure. Inserting elements is a simple process which we 
described above. When we want to delete an element from Bloom 
filter data structure, we need to set the corresponding bits to zero. 
However, it is possible that this operation will affect bits which 
were set to 1 by hash function for different element of IP set. 
In this situation the Bloom filter no longer provides correct 
representation of the elements of the IP set.  
This problem was solved in work [2] which outlined new data 
structure called Counting Bloom Filter (CBF). In the CBF data 
structure, bits in vector V are replaced by integers which are used 
as counters. If we want to save a track of element ipx in the data 
structure, each counter corresponding value of independent hash 
functions will be incremented. During deletion of an element 
appropriate counters are decremented. 
1.3. Modified CBF 
Simplification of the CBF structure is one of our 
contributions. The solution consists of one table of counters used 
for inbound and one table of counters used for outbound TCP 
connections. Such simplification can be done as in defined short 
time interval the tables of counters are re-initialized to 0. 
Increment and decrement of the counters are designed to fit the 
proposed solutions to detect SYN flood attack and these will be 
described in later section S-Orthros detection algorithm. 
1.4. Independent Hash Functions 
Finding well designed set of hash functions is as important for 
the correct storage and distribution of elements in the CBF data 
structure as well as for the performance of hash functions. In a 
comparative study performed by Chen and Yeung in paper [1], 
there are independent hashes functions designed which have low 
probability of collision. 32-bit IP address is used as a key for the 
hash functions. 
The hash functions are defined as follows:  
 hi(IP ) = (IP + IP mod pi) mod n, 1≤i≤k, 
where mod denotes the modulus operation, n is the row length of 
the hash table, and pi is a prime number less than n. 
Following table shows comparison of the proposed hash 
function with other known hash functions. 
Our examination resulted in setting variables as follows: 
n=1024, k=4. 
Table 1.  Table tested hash functions [1] 
Hash function Consumed time (s) Number of collisions 
Our function 0.187 0 
Robert’s 32-bit function 0.188 3838 
Robert’s 96-bit function 0.250 0 
Cruth’s function 0.031 977 
Hybrid function 0.328 0 
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2. Detection algorithm S-Orthros 
As mentioned above, the algorithm for detecting SYN Flood 
attack uses CBF data structure which is modified for our attack 
detection purposes. Modification of the data structure has yielded 
to simplification and clarification of the solution and also the 
algorithm itself. The intention is therefore the evaluation of the 
conditions and thus attack detection for a given constant time 
interval. 
Consider the case where the detection algorithm cooperates 
with a measuring tool which is used to capture and analyze 
network traffic in real time. At the beginning, the network 
administrator starts the process of capturing network traffic which 
runs as the main program. Other processes are invoked and run as 
separate threads. At the end of the main process of capturing 
network traffic also other running threads are closed. 
After a defined time, another process is run to analyze the 
measured network traffic information. In this process, the data 
which are important for the detection algorithm S-Orthros are 
being stored. In this case, the relevant data are source and 
destination IP addresses and these are saved through the 
independent hash functions to the modified CBF. The modified 
CBF consists of two tables containing N counters.  
The first table is used to store information about the source IP 
address while the second table provides space to store destination 
IP addresses. During the analysis, the detection algorithm 
S-Orthros collects information about initiated connection, i.e. 
SYN packet and information of confirmation of the connection, 
i.e. ACK packet. If analysis detects SYN packet, the data structure 
is incremented - both tables of counters are modified. In case of 
ACK packet confirming SYN packet, data structures in both tables 
are decremented. If there is no flood attack, the handshake is 
correct, and data structures remain empty - a pair of IP addresses 
in the first SYN packet is stored, and after confirming ACK packet 
they are cleared.  
In case of flood attack, values in CBF structure are very rising. 
Threshold of acceptable half-open connections has been 
empirically set to 50. Verification process compares this threshold 
value with the measured SYN-SENT value and according to the 
result either starts or does not starts the process of creating an alert 
message. 
3. Evaluating proposed solution 
 Through Modified CBF we are able to distinguish different 
variations of SYN flood attacks. We have identified the following 
possible TCP SYN attacks: 
 Random SYN flood – generating a random source spoofed IP 
address for each packet 
 Subnet SYN flood – generating source spoofed IP address 
from specific subnet for each packet 
 Fixed SYN flood - several IP addresses from which the attack 
is launched  
Each one of these attacks can be identified thanks to the 
typical arrangement of IP addresses stored in the used data 
structure. This arrangement of IP addresses has been verified by 
table editor on sample of 250.000 IP addresses and the results are 
shown in the following figure 1 shown below. 
We can clearly see that the system is being attacked as the 
values are much higher than 0 level which describes usual traffic. 
4. Conclusion 
We proposed and implemented detection module S-Orthros 
based on modified Counting Bloom filter, which provides 
information about currently ongoing TCP SYN attack to network 
administrator. Detection module has been tested for several TCP 
SYN attacks and its functionality has been verified and evaluated. 
Within the detection module has been proposed and implemented 
various methods for the timely sending of information about the 
ongoing attack. For its extensiveness they have not been described 
in this paper. 
   
Fig. 1. TCP SYN attacks 
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